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ABSTRACT
This article develops and implements a simulation approach to value patents and patent-protected R&D
projects based on the Real Options approach. It takes into account uncertainty in the cost-to-completion of
the project, uncertainty in the cash flows to be generated from the project, and the possibility of catastrophic
events that could put an end to the effort before it is completed. It also allows for the possibility of
abandoning the project when costs turn out to be larger than expected or when estimated cash flows turn out
to be smaller than anticipated. This abandonment option represents a very substantial part of the project's
value when the project is marginal or/and when uncertainty is large. 
The model presented can be used to evaluate the effects of regulation on the cost of innovation and the
amount on innovative output. The main focus of the article is the pharmaceutical industry. The framework,
however, applies just as well to other research-intensive industries such as software or hardware development.
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The pharmaceutical industry has become a research-oriented sector that makes a major 
contribution to health care.  The success of the industry in generating a stream of new 
drugs with important therapeutic benefits has created an intense public policy debate over 
issues such as the financing of the cost of research, the prices charged for its products and 
the socially optimal degree of patent protection.
1
  There is a trade-off between promoting innovative efforts and securing 
competitive market outcomes.  The expected monopoly profits from ethical drug sales 
during the life of the patent compensate the innovator for its risky investment, while the 
onset of competition after the expiration of the patent limits the deadweight losses to 
society that arise from monopoly pricing under the patent.  The research-oriented sector 
of the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on the patent system.   
  “Because regulation has had important effects on the cost of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry, a great deal of research has been done on the innovation end of 
the trade-off between innovation and competition.  The cost of innovation, the effect of 
regulation on cost and innovative output, and the dependence of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ rents on innovation have been much studied.”
2
  In this article I take the regulatory environment as given and concentrate on the 
valuation of an R&D project that is patent protected. I also present a methodology to 
determine the value of a patent to develop a particular product (e.g. a drug).  The model 
presented, however, can be used to evaluate the effects of regulation on the cost of 
innovation and the amount on innovative output.  This can be accomplished by analyzing 
                                                           
1 This discussion is based on Caves et al. (1991). 
2 Caves et al. (1991), page 2. 
  3the effect on valuation and optimal abandonment policy of changes in the regulatory 
parameters in the model.  The focus of this article is the pharmaceutical industry.  The 
framework, however, applies just as well to other research-intensive industries such as 
software or hardware development. 
  The analysis of R&D projects is one of the most difficult investment problems.  
The development of a drug, for example, can take ten or more years to complete.  During 
all this period, investments have to be made without reaping any of the possible benefits 
of the investment, and with a significant probability of having to put an end to the effort 
for technical or economic reasons.  In addition, even for successful efforts, there is 
uncertainty about the actual costs of development. Further, after the drug has been 
successfully developed and approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) there is 
substantial uncertainty about the sales and cash flows that it will generate. To value the 
R&D project or patent, these cash flows have to be assessed long before they are realized. 
  The approach taken in this article is to treat the R&D project or the patent as a 
complex option on the variables underlying the value of the project, which in this case are 
the expected costs to completion and the estimated cash flows after completion.   
Uncertainty is introduced in the analysis by allowing these variables to follow stochastic 
processes through time.  This type of approach, generally known as the Real Options 
approach, has been successfully applied to value mines (Brennan and Schwartz (1985)), 
oil leases (Paddock, et al. (1988)), and many other real assets.
3
  Several papers in the economics and finance literature study the issue of 
investment in patents and R&D.  For example, Pakes (1985) provides an empirical 
  4characterization of the dynamic relationship among the number of successful patent 
applications of industrial firms and the stock market valuation of the firm.  Pakes (1986) 
looks at the annual renewal fee patent-holders must pay in order to keep their patents in 
force, and develops and estimates a model which allows to recover the distribution of 
returns for holding patents at each age over the lifespan of patents.  Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2000) look at the impact of patents on productivity and market value using 
patent citations as a proxy for innovation.  Parry, Rose and Smith (1999) study the 
appropriate sources of financing for biotechnology firms and conclude that, contrary to 
the pecking order theory of capital structure, equity or equity-type securities issues are at 
the top of the pecking order. 
  Childs and Triantis (1999) examine dynamic R&D investment policies and the 
valuation of R&D programs in a real options framework.  They focus on the interactions 
across projects and look at optimal policies for a firm with multiple R&D projects that 
can run in parallel or sequentially.  They also introduce capital rationing constraints and 
competition into the analysis.  Myers and Howe (1997) present a life cycle model of 
investments in pharmaceutical R&D programs.  Uncertainty is explicitly accounted in the 
model, which is solved using Monte Carlo simulation. 
There are two papers that are closest to this one.  The first one is Schwartz and 
Moon (2000) which deals with some of the same issues discussed in this paper.  There 
are important differences, however, both in the formulation of the problem and in the 
solution procedure between Schwartz and Moon and this article.  In Schwartz and Moon, 
once investment in R&D is completed, the owner of the project receives the value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 There is a large and growing literature on Real Options.  See for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and 
  5approved drug in the form of a single cash flow.  In that framework calendar time does 
not enter into the solution of the problem.  In this paper, more realistically, upon approval 
the owner starts receiving cash flows with timing, and possibly duration, depending on 
the duration of the R&D investment.  If a patent is obtained before the completion of the 
R&D investment, the duration of the cash flows will depend critically on the duration of 
the investment; that is, it will be path dependant.  Since now both the duration of the 
investment and the duration of the cash flows are random variables, the problem cannot 
be easily solved directly from the partial differential equation. In this paper, the problem 
is solved by Monte Carlo simulation adapting the procedure developed by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (2001) for valuing American type options. This provides for the option to 
abandon the project if investment costs turn out to be higher and/or cash flows turn out to 
be lower than anticipated.  The simulation approach used is not only easily applied to 
multifactor and path dependant problems, but it is also very intuitive, flexible and 
transparent. In addition, it provides insights that are lost in the more complex numerical 
solution to the partial differential equation. 
The second paper that is closely related is Berk, Green and Naik (2003). They 
also focus on the development of a single R&D project and take as exogenous the process 
describing the cash flows the project will generate. However, since the focus of this paper 
is patent-protected R&D projects, not only the level of cash flows is uncertain but also 
the duration of these cash flows. They assume that the cash flows last for ever which 
simplifies the value of the completed project to the continuously compounded version of 
the growing perpetuity formula.  In addition, they take as exogenous the technology for 
randomly advancing through stages of the project whereas I take as exogenous the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trigeorgis (1996). 
  6stochastic process for the expected cost to completion of the project (as in Pindyck 
(1993).  While their formulation is more fundamental in this respect, it makes it harder to 
employ in practice to value R&D projects. 
The theoretical model is developed in Section 2.  Section 3 gives a detailed 
implementation of the approach using data that is representative of the pharmaceutical 
industry to value a particular drug development project.  Sensitivity of the project value 
to the key parameters in the model is also presented.  Section 4 discusses some possible 
extensions of the model to take into account more realistic situations that were omitted in 
the simple model developed in Section 2.  Finally, Section 5 gives some concluding 
remarks. The details of the Monte Carlo simulation methodology are presented in the 
Appendix. 
2.  Model 
Consider an investment in R&D that takes time to complete.  The maximum rate at which 




~ with expected value  . When, and if, the project is completed the 
owner starts receiving the benefits of the investment represented by the net cash flow rate 
C, which follows a stochastic process to be described below.   
]
~
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Assume that a patent protecting the R&D project expires at time T, after which a 
successful project will be subject to a more intense competition such that cash flows will 
decrease substantially. In this framework, both the time to completion of the project and 
duration of the cash flows protected by the patent are random variables. 
To reflect the fact that many R&D projects fail, assume that during the period of 
investment there is a Poisson probability λ  per unit of time that the project will fail and 
  7its value will jump to zero.  This probability of failure is what Schwartz and Moon (2000) 
call catastrophic events, such as the situation where another firm wins the race to obtain a 
patent on the product, or the drug turns out to have a terrible side effect.  In the 
framework below we concentrate on another reason to stop the project: the optimal 
exercise of the abandonment option when costs turn out to be higher than expected and/or 
cash flows turn out to be to lower than anticipated.  This abandonment option can have 
substantial value when the project is marginal, or when uncertainty is large as is the case 
for most R&D projects. 
2.1  Investment Cost Uncertainty 
The dynamics of the expected cost to completion of the R&D project is described by the 
controlled diffusion process:
4
(1)  dz IK Idt dK 2
1
) ( σ + − =  
where dz is an increment to a Gauss Wiener process that is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the market portfolio.
5  The first term is the control of the diffusion process: as 
investment proceeds, the estimated remaining cost to completion decreases. The second 
term corresponds to what Pindyck calls technical uncertainty which is related to the 
physical difficulty of completing the project and therefore can only resolved by investing 
in the project. More complex specifications of the expected cost dynamics can easily be 
incorporated in the analysis, such as including input cost uncertainty.
6  The advantage of 
the simple specification in equation (1) is that it gives rise to a bang-bang solution for the 
optimal control (optimal investment is either at the maximum possible rate or at zero) 
                                                           
4 See Pindyck (1993) and Schwartz and Moon (2000).  Note that any alternative process could be used 
without major changes in the analysis that follows. 
5 The implication of this is that cost uncertainty will not have a risk premium associated to it. 
  8when the cost and cash flow processes are uncorrelated, and that the variance of the cost 
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This expression, which relates the variance of the project’s total cost and the volatility 
parameter σ , can be used to infer reasonable values for this volatility parameter. 
2.2  Cash Flow Uncertainty 
The dynamics of the net cash flow rate is described by the Geometric Brownian 
motion:
8,9
(3) Cdw Cdt dC φ α + =  
where dw in an increment to a Gauss Wiener process which is correlated with the market 
portfolio and which may also be correlated with the uncertainty in the expected cost to 
completion of the project.  The drift in the cash flow process reflects the characteristics of 
a particular R&D program.  Note that these cash flows start to be received by the owner 
of the project only after the investment has been completed. Before that time they 
represent the current cash flow the project would have produced if it were completed.  
These cash flow change as more information is obtained through investment and through 
an increased knowledge of the market for the product.  The correlation between cost and 
cash flow uncertainty, ρ , also reflects the characteristics of a particular R&D program.  
In some cases, for example, higher than predicted investment costs may also translate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Input cost uncertainty will be discussed in Section 4. 
7 See Pindyck (1993). 
8 This is the stochastic process used in Schwartz and Zozaya (2001a and 2001b).  Other processes, such as 
an Arithmetic Brownian motion, could be used without changing the nature of the analysis. 
9 These cash flows are net of production and marketing costs to be made once the R&D is complete. 
  9into lower than predicted cash flows: this would imply a negative correlation between 
costs and cash flows. 
Equation (3) represents the dynamics of the true process for the cash flows.  For 
valuation purposes, however, the risk neutral or risk adjusted process for the cash flows 
will be used: 
(4) Cdw Cdt Cdw Cdt dC φ α φ η α + = + − = * ) (  
where η is the risk premium associated with the cash flow process (to be defined below) 
and  * α  is the risk adjusted drift. 
2.3 Value of Project once Investment has been Completed 
When the investment in the R&D project has been successfully completed, the value of 
the project depends only on the net cash flows to be generated from the project.  Let 
V(C,t) be the value of the project at time t for cash flows C, and assume that the patent 
for the product expires at time T.  Also assume that the residual value of the project, 
represented by the possible cash flows generated after the patent expires, is a multiple M 
of the cash flows at time T
10.  Different specifications of the post-patent cash flows will 
be discussed in Section 4. 
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The first term in Equation (7) represents the present value of the cash flows up to the 
expiration of the patent and the second term represents the present value of the terminal 
value of the project.  Note that the value of the project after the investment is completed 
is linear in the cash flows and does not depend on the volatility of the cash flows.  This 
will not be the case, however, during the period of investment, which is the main focus of 
this paper. 
Applying Ito’s Lemma to Equation (7) and using (3), after some manipulation the 
(true) stochastic process for the value of the successful project can be shown to be: 
(8) dw dt r
V
dV
φ η + + = ) (  
Equation (8) verifies that the volatility of the total return on the successful project 
and its risk premium are the same as the volatility of the cash flows and the risk premium 
associated with the cash flow process, respectively.  The returns on successful R&D 
projects can then be used to estimate cash flow volatility and the risk premium 
parameter.
11  Assuming the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing model of Merton (1973) 
applies, the risk premium is equal to the beta of the successful project times the risk 
premium on the market portfolio: 
(9) ) ( r rm − = β η  
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 If the market becomes perfectly competitive after the patent expires, M would be equal to zero. 
11 It should be pointed out that this is not a trivial matter since traded “pure play” successful R&D projects 
would be needed.  But, even when traditional discounted cash flow methods of valuation are used, risk 
adjusted discount rates are required.  
  11Equation (9) provides for an easy way for estimating the risk premium in the model. The 
assumptions employed here would the same ones used when the CAPM is used to 
determine the risk adjusted discount rate in NPV calculations. 
2.4 Value of the Investment Opportunity 
Before the investment is completed, the value of the R&D project at time t, F(C,K,t), 
depends both on the cash flow rate the project would have produced if it were completed 
and on the expected costs to completion, and calendar time.  This value must satisfy the 
following partial differential equation:
12
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subject to the boundary condition: 
(11) ) , ( ) , 0 , ( τ τ C V C F =  
where the left-hand side of the boundary condition comes from Equation (7) and λ is the 
Poisson probability per unit of time that the project will fail.   
The difficulty with boundary condition (11) is that the completion date of the 
investment,  τ , is a random variable. The value of the R&D project at completion 
depends not only on the cash flows at that time, but also on how long the investment took 
place, because the duration of the cash flows is limited to the expiration of the patent.  In 
this case, Equation (10) cannot be easily solved by conventional numerical methods. 
In the Appendix, a simulation method is proposed that solves Equation (10) with 
boundary condition (11) under two simplifying assumptions: 
                                                           
12 Schwartz and Moon (2000) derive a similar equation but with the fundamental difference that it is 
independent of calendar time.  The resulting elliptic partial differential equation can then be solved by 
standard finite difference procedured. 
  12(a) The investment strategy takes two possible extremes values: to invest at the 
maximum possible rate or not to invest at all.  This bang-bang policy is exactly 
optimal only for the case where the cost and cash flow processes are uncorrelated. 
The possibility of investment at a lower level than the maximum possible rate, 
however, is unlikely to have a significant effect for low correlation values. 
(b) Once the project is abandoned, it will not be started again.  That is, only the 
abandonment option is considered in the analysis, not the options to delay investing 
and to stop and restart investment in the future if future cash flow estimates 
improve.
13  It is important to consider, however, that as time passes, the duration of 
the cash flows decreases since there is an expiration date for the pa tent.  This makes 
delaying investment extremely costly. 
2.5 Critical Values for Costs and Cash Flows 
The solution to (10) and (11) also gives the critical values for the state variables which 
separates investment form abandonment.  For every level of the cash flow rate there is a 
critical cost to completion, K
*(C), above which it is not optimal to invest in the project.  
Equivalently, for every level of cost to completion there is a critical cash flow rate, 
C
*(K), below which it is not optimal to invest in the project.  The value of the project or 
patent when it is not optimal to invest is zero. These functions define a critical curve in 
the K-C space. This curve would naturally be a function of time and of all the other fixed 
parameters of the valuation problem. 
2.6 Valuation under Certainty 
Traditional NPV valuations discount the net cash flows to a project at a risk-adjusted 
discount rate.  For comparison purposes, the R&D investment problem described above 
  13can be analyzed in this framework by setting the cost and cash flow volatilities equal to 
zero. The relevant risk premium and the probability of failure can then be incorporated in 
the discount rate.  This analysis would correspond exactly to the traditional NPV 
valuation. 
Under certainty, the time to completion of the investment would be deterministic 
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and the NPV of the project would be: 
(13) )] ) ( exp( 1 [ ) )] ( ) [( exp( ) , ( K
m
K K T r
r
I
T r T C V NPV λ
λ
η α λ + − −
+
− − − + − =  
The first term represents the present value of the cash flows at time TK (from Equation 
(7)) discounted at the appropriate risky rate, and the second term represents the integral 
of the (discounted) investment costs until completion. 
2.7  Volatility and Beta of R&D Project 
Using Ito’s Lemma and stochastic processes (1) and (3), it is easy to derive the volatility 
and the beta of the investment opportunity: 
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13 In Section 4 I discuss this in more detail. 
  14  The beta of the project equals the beta of the successful project times the elasticity 
of the project’s value to changes in cash flows.  The volatility of project depends on the 
volatilities of the two stochastic processes and their correlation.
14
3.   Implementation of the Approach 
3.1 Data for Drug Development Project 
To illustrate the implementation of the methodology proposed in this article, I evaluate an 
R&D project for the development of an ethical drug using, as much as possible, typical 
parameter values from the pharmaceutical industry.  A typical self-originated new drug 
introduction requires over US$100 million of out-of-pocket expenditures
15, so I will take 
$100 million to be the expected cost to completion of the project.  Since the average time 
to complete is 10 years
16 I will assume that the maximum investment rate is $10 million 
per year. This is a simplification of reality since different phases of the R&D project 
require different levels of investment
17. 
  DiMasi et al. (1995, pp. 204) find that “only 23% of the new drug candidates that 
enter phase I clinical trials will eventually be approved by the FDA”.  But this success 
rate takes into account both the failures due to catastrophic events and the optimal 
exercise of the abandonment option. Assuming that one half of the projects fail due to 
catastrophic events, and considering an average time to completion of the investment is 
10 years, the Poisson probability of failure can be computed as: 
07 . 0
50 . 0 ) 10 exp( ) exp(
=
= − = −
λ
λ λ K T
 
                                                           
14 Apart from the covariance term these formulas are the same as those found in Schwartz and Moon 
(2000). 
15 See DiMasi et al. (1991). 
16 See DiMasi et al. (1995). 
17 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. 
  15  The volatility parameter in equation (1) is inferred from the variance of the costs 
to completion in equation (2).  For a volatility parameter equal to 0.5, the standard 
deviation of the cost to completion is $37.8 million (for an expected costs to completion 
of $100 million)
18. 
The Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465), which became 
effective on June 8, 1995, changed the patent term in the United States. Before June 8, 
1995, patents typically had 17 years of patent life from the date the patent was issued. 
Patents granted after the June 8, 1995 date now have a 20-year patent life from the date of 
the first filing of the patent application.
19 However, innovative pharmaceutical products 
undergo, on average, more than 10 years of development and regulatory approval before 
coming to market. This reduces the effective patent life of innovative pharmaceutical 
products to less than 10 years.  I assume that the total life of the project is 20 years of 
which, on average, 10 years will be devoted to the development of the drug and 10 years 
will be generating cash flows.  Note that the choice of the starting point of the life of the 
patent to evaluate the project is arbitrary.  The project can just as well be evaluated, with 
the necessary adjustments in costs and time to completion, a few years into the patent or 
even before the patent has been obtained. 
The estimated cash flows of the project are assumed to be $20 million per year
20 
and growing stochastically at 2% per year (the rate of inflation) according to Equation 
(3).  The cash flow volatility parameter in (3) and (8) is obtained as the average implied 
volatility for traded call options of nine pharmaceutical companies (0.35).  The beta to be 
                                                           
18 This standard deviation is smaller, but of the same order of magnitude, than the standard deviation 
reported in Table 2 of DiMasi et al. (1991) for 93 randomly selected new chemical entities. 
19 U.S. Food and Drug Administration – Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Website. 
20 This is consistent with the average cash flows reported in Grabowski and Vernon (1994). 
  16used to compute the risk premium in Equation (9) is also obtained as the average beta of 
the same pharmaceutical companies (0.6).
21  Using a risk premium on the market 
portfolio of 6%, the resulting risk premium associated with the cash flow process is 3.6%. 
The correlation between the stochastic processes for cost and cash flows depends 
on the characteristics of the R&D project, and, in general, it is probably small
22.  Since 
more successful projects take a shorter time to develop and cost less, cash flows from 
these projects might be larger.  In this case a negative correlation might be reasonable. In 
the base case I assume a correlation of –0.1 and in the comparative statics section I 
analyze the sensitivity of the results to changes in this parameter.  
At the expiration of the patent, the entry of generic drug products significantly 
decreases the cash flows to the patent-holder.
23 To take into account the cash flows 
generated after the expiration of the patent, I assume that the terminal value of the project 
is five times the terminal cash flow rate. 
In the simulation approach developed in this article it would be relatively easy to 
include stochastic interest rates, but, for simplicity, I assume that the risk-free rate of 
interest is constant and equal to 5%. Finally, the step size for the simulations and the 
evaluation of the abandonment option is one quarter of a year, and the number of 
simulations performed is 100,000.  Table 1 summarizes the parameters described above. 
3.2  Valuation of Drug Development Project 
Figure 1 shows a randomly selected path of costs and (true) cash flows using the 
parameters in Table 1.  For this particular path, investment takes 8.5 years to complete. 
                                                           
21 Clearly, more accurate estimates of the volatility of the cash flows and the beta coefficient could be 
obtained from pure equity firms that produce only one drug. 
22 The fact that all drugs must go through the same general regulatory process might suggest a low 
correlation. 
  17Estimated cash flows at the evaluation time (time 0) are $5 million per quarter. At the 
time they start to be generated in year 8.5, however, they are only $2.74 million per 
quarter.  During the duration of the investment, the cash flows represent the cash flows 
that would occur if the project was completed.  At the expiration of the patent, cash flows 
grow to $6.60 million.  It should be pointed out that Figure 1 illustrates only one of the 
100,000 paths generated for the evaluation, and might not represent a typical or average 
path. 
  Table 2 displays the valuation results for five different seeds for the random 
number generator. The first row gives the value of the project with the abandonment 
option, the second row gives the proportion of paths in which it is optimal to abandon the 
project, and the third row gives the value of the project using the same simulations but 
not allowing abandonment.   
The real options value of the project (with the abandonment option) lies between 
$12.9 and $14.0 million, with a mean of $13.4 million.  The standard deviation of the 
mean in all cases is very close to $0.4 million, so all values lye well within two standard 
deviations from the mean.  The proportion of paths abandoned lies between 39.9% and 
42.5% with a mean of 41.0%.  The value of the project without the option to abandon lies 
between $4.8 and $5.7 million, with a mean of $5.2 million (again the standard deviation 
of the mean is around $0.4 million).  The approximate value of the abandonment option 
is $8.2 million, which in this case represents a very large proportion of the value of the 
project.  In 41% of the paths this option is optimally exercised. 
  The percentage of paths abandoned each quarter for the first four years is shown 
in Table 3.  At the end of the first quarter 2.58% of the paths are optimally abandoned. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 See Grabowski and Vernon (1992). 
  18Conditional on not having been abandoned before, 5.85% are abandoned at the end of the 
second quarter, and so on.  Most of the abandonment decisions are taken in the first two 
years, but some reduced percentages occur well beyond the fourth year.  Note that all 
these abandonment decisions correspond to the risk-neutral paths.  The proportion of 
abandonment using the true paths would be somewhat smaller. 
The net present value of this project, assuming certainty, and computed using 
Equation (13) is -$7.4 million.  A simple NPV calculation used to value the project would 
suggest that it should not be undertaken.  It is rather surprising to see the big difference 
that exists between the value of the project without the option to abandon and the simple 
NPV: $12.6 million.  The reason for this is Jensen’s inequality: the expected value of a 
convex function is larger than the function of the expected value.  Figure 2 shows that the 
NPV of the project is a convex function of the cost to completion.  This effect is 
magnified when there is a negative correlation between cash flows and costs to 
completion since more extreme valuations are possible.  
The simulated cost distribution is depicted in Figure 3.  Note that approximately 
2.3% of the paths get to the expiration of the patent without being completed.  These 
would certainly be abandoned much earlier in the respective simulation.  The mean of the 
simulated costs is $99.8 million, very close to the $100 million assumed ex-ante, but the 
standard deviation is $34.8 million, somewhat smaller that the $37.8 million assumed ex-
ante.
24
3.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
3.3.1 Uncertainty Parameters 
                                                           
24 This is due to the truncation of the distribution at 20 years. 
  19Table 4 shows the effect of the uncertainty parameters (volatilities and correlation) on the 
value of the R&D opportunity.  The top panel shows the effect of changing the cost 
uncertainty parameter while keeping all the other parameters as in Table 1.  As is typical 
in option pricing, the value of the project unambiguously increases with cost uncertainty. 
The probability of abandonment goes down with increased cost uncertainty since in this 
framework the only way to “learn” about the project costs is by investing: with more 
uncertainty there is more to learn by investing.  Interestingly, the value of the project 
without the option to abandon increases even more in value with increased uncertainty. 
The result of this is that the value of the option to abandon actually slightly decreases in 
value with increased cost uncertainty.  The option to abandon is less valuable because it 
is used less often. 
  The middle panel in Table 4 gives the same information as the top panel, but for 
changes in cash flow uncertainty.  The value of the project also increases with cash flow 
uncertainty, but in this case the probability of abandonment increases.  More uncertainty 
in the cash flows increases the probability of good outcomes, but it also increases the 
probability of bad outcomes and therefore, the probability of abandonment. The option to 
abandon, then, is more valuable as indicated in the last column of the table. 
  The above analysis indicates that cost uncertainty and cash flow uncertainty have  
a different effect on the project.  Though increases in both lead to increases in the value 
of the project, the probability of abandonment and the value of the option to abandon 
move in the opposite direction. Another way of presenting this result is that higher cash 
flow (value) uncertainty leads to delay investment (as is traditional in option pricing), 
  20whereas higher cost uncertainty leads to advance investment (since you only learn by 
investing). 
  The bottom panel in Table 4 presents the effect of changes in correlation.  The 
higher is the correlation between costs and cash flows, the lower is the value of the 
project, with or without the option to abandon.  This is because a negative correlation 
implies that when costs are low, cash flows tend to be high, and vise versa: this leads to a 
wider distribution of values.  The reverse is true when the correlation is positive.  As the 
correlation increases the project becomes more marginal, the probability of abandonment 
increases and the option to abandon becomes more valuable. 
  All the values in Table 4 are directly comparable (without simulation error) 
because the same random numbers were used in all the simulations.
25  They correspond 
to those used in the last column of Table 2.  Since uncertainty does not affect the net 
present value of a project, the net present value of the project without uncertainty for all 
the cases in the table is -$7.4 million.  
3.3.2 Cost and Cash Flow Parameters 
The effects on project values and probabilities of abandonment of changes in expected 
costs to completion, maximum investment rate, cash flow rate and terminal cash flow 
multiple are presented in Table 5.  All of them have predictable effects: values increase 
and probabilities of abandonment decrease when expected cost to completion decrease, 
when the maximum investment rate increases, when cash flow rate increases, and when 
the terminal cash flow multiple increases. The value of the option to abandon, however, 
is more valuable the more marginal the project and the higher the probability of 
abandoning it. 
  21  The level of expected investment costs has a large effect on the value of the 
project since they are all paid before cash flows start to be generated.  The effects are also 
asymmetric: a 10% increase in costs decreases the value of the project by $6.24 million, 
whereas a 10% decrease in costs increases the value by $8.53 million.  The main reason 
for this is that when costs increase, the option to abandon is used more often preventing 
additional losses. 
  The value of the project increases with the investment rate because cash flows 
will start earlier since investment will be completed faster.  Since the patent expires in 20 
years, the duration of the cash flows will also be longer. 
  The value of the project is somewhat less sensitive to the cash flow rate and the 
cash flow multiple at the expiration of the patent than to the total investment costs.  The 
reason for this is that cash flows are to be generated in a distant future.  This is especially 
true for the terminal cash flow. 
3.3.3   Parameters that Affect Compounding and Discounting 
There are three parameters in the model that affect the compounding and discounting of 
costs and cash flows.  These are the drift of the cash flow process
26, the Poisson 
probability of failure during investment, and the risk-free rate of interest.  Table 6 shows 
the effects of changes in these parameters on valuation and probability of abandonment. 
  The top panel of Table 6 shows the effect of changes in the drift of the cash flow 
process.  These are substantial, but these results should be interpreted with caution, since 
a higher cash flow drift would probably be due to a higher expected inflation, which 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 The same applies to the next two subsections and to Tables 5 and 6. 
26 Actually only the risk adjusted drift affects valuation, so changes in the risk premium have exactly the 
same, and opposite, effect on valuation that changes in the true drift of the cash flow process. 
  22would also affect in similar fashion the risk-free rate (bottom panel in Table 6).  These 
two effects would, to a large degree, mitigate one another. 
  As expected, a higher probability of catastrophic failure decreases the value of the 
project and increases the probability that it will be abandoned. These results are shown in 
the middle panel of Table 6. 
3.3.4  Time to Expiration of the Patent 
Table 7 reports the sensitivity of the value of the project with respect to changes in the 
time to expiration of the patent.  This is an important parameter since it depends on 
public policy.  Changes in the time to expiration of the patent have significant effects on 
the value of the project.  Extending the duration of the patent by 10% increases the value 
of the project by 35%.
27   
  The model can also be used to analyze issues of public policy such as the tradeoff 
between the duration of a patent and the allowable competition by generic drugs at the 
expiration of the patent.  For example, assume that the degree of allowable competition 
can be represented by the multiple of cash flows that the patent-holder receives at the 
expiration of the patent.  Then a 10% reduction of the life of the patent (from 20 to 18 
years) would require an increase of this multiple from 5 to 7.6 to approximately maintain 
the same value of the R&D project. 
3.4  Critical Values 
For any given level of the cash flow rate we can increase the cost to completion until the 
project is immediately abandoned and its value is zero.  This is the critical cost to 
                                                           
27 In comparing the results reported in Table 7 it should be noted that they are subject to simulation error 
since, given their different duration, each row uses different random numbers. 
  23completion above which it is not optimal to invest in the project.  For the base case cash 
flow rate of $20 million the critical cost is $125 million. 
  Alternatively, for any given level of cost we can decrease the cash flow rate until 
abandonment is optimal at the initial period.  This is the critical cash flow rate below 
which it is not optimal to invest.  For the base case cost of $100 million the critical cash 
flow rate is $13.6 million. 
  Figure 4 shows the critical cash flows rates (critical costs) for costs between $80 
and $100 million (cash flow rates between $9 and $18 million).  Above (or to the left of) 
the curve, when cash flows are high and/or cost are low it is optimal to invest.  Below (or 
to the right of) the curve it is optimal to abandon the project.
28
3.5  Risk Measures of the R&D Project 
To compute the volatility and the beta of the project using Equations (14) and (15), we 
need first to compute the derivatives of the project’s value with respect to expected costs 
and cash flows.  These derivatives are computed numerically applying the same 
simulation procedure, perturbing these variables (by 1%) using the same seed in the 
random number generator. 
  The risk measures for the R&D project are substantially higher than those of the 
successful project.  The volatility of the project computed using Equation (14) is 1.51, 
which is more than 4 times larger than the average volatility (0.35) of the nine 
pharmaceutical companies used as a proxy for the successful project.  The beta of the 
project computed using Equation (15) is 2.01, which is more than 3 times larger than the 
average beta (0.60) of the same nine companies.  
                                                           
28 The results reported in Figure 4 were done using 10,000 simulations. 
  24  This high level of risk is to be expected since at the start of the project 
approximately $100 million have to be invested over a period of ten years before starting 
to receive the benefits of this investment.  Expected returns on the investment, however, 
should be commensurate to its risks.
29
4.  Extensions of the Analysis 
The model developed and discussed in the previous sections is a simplified description of 
the real world.  In this section some important features of the pharmaceutical industry are 
presented, and I discuss how the simple model developed can be modified to deal with 
these features.  There are two stages in pharmaceutical research and development: drug 
discovery (the research stage) and drug development.  The goal of the research phase is to 
find a chemical compound that has the desirable effect in a “screen” that mimics some 
aspect of a disease state in man, while the goal of the drug development process is to 
ensure that compounds identified through the research process are safe and effective in 
humans (Henderson and Cockburn (1996a), page 34). 
4.1  Drug Development Process 
New drug development is a sequential process.  At several points in the process a 
pharmaceutical firm will review the status of testing on the drug and make a decision on 
whether to continue with its development or abandon the project.  The decision will 
depend on factors such as potential therapeutic benefits, expected frequency and severity 
of adverse reactions, projected additional development, marketing, distribution, and 
production costs and estimates of the future revenue stream.
30
                                                           
29 According to Grobowski and Vernon (1990, 1994) realized returns on new drug introductions in the 
1970s and early 1980s have not been of an order of magnitude to justify this high level of risk.  It should be 
taken into account, however, that they include the cost of failed projects in the cost of successful ones. 
30 This discussion is based on DiMasi et al. (1991), pages 109 and 110. 
  25  Once a new compound has been identified and is considered a promising 
candidate for further development the firm will file with the FDA an Investigational New 
Drug Application.  The firm may begin clinical (human) testing of the drug thirty days 
after the filing unless the FDA places a hold on the application. Clinical testing normally 
occurs over three distinct phases, each of which contributes different amounts and types 
of information on safety and efficacy.   
  In phase I, testing is performed on a small number of usually healthy volunteers. 
The main purpose of these trials is to obtain information on toxicity and safe dosing 
ranges in humans.  In phase II the drug is administered to a larger number of individuals 
consisting of patients for whom the drug was intended to benefit.  The purpose of these 
trials is to provide the first significant evidence of efficacy, and additional safety 
information.  Phase III involves large-scale trials on patients.  The purpose of these trials 
is to find definitive evidence of efficacy and any possible adverse reactions. 
  A New Drug Application is submitted to the FDA for review once the clinical 
development phases have been completed and the firm believes it has sufficient evidence 
for approval. Marketing for the new drug can only begin upon notification from the FDA.  
The FDA review can be considered as a fourth phase in the cycle. 
  The simulation approach can readily be adapted to deal with different phases of 
investment. The expected cost to completion, the maximum rate of investment, the cost 
volatility, and the probability of failure would, in general, be different for different 
phases.  The correlation between costs and estimated cash flows could also be different 
for the different phases.  Then, for each phase j, the dynamics of the expected cost to 
completion (from Equation (1)) would be: 
  26(16) j j j j j j dz K I dt I dK 2
1
) ( σ + − =  
Phase j would have to be completed before the start of phase j+1.
31  Moreover, the 
approach allows for the cost variables (expected cost to completion, maximum 
investment rate, volatility of costs and probability of failure) in phase j+1 to depend on 
the realized cost variables in phase j.  For example, if the realized total investment costs 
in a given phase turn out to be lower than expected, it seems likely that the expected costs 
in the subsequent phase would also be lower than originally expected.  It would be very 
unlikely that any other method of solution, other than simulation, would be able to deal 
with this complex type of path dependency. 
  Given that for every new chemical entity that is approved, there are several others 
that are abandoned at some point in the development process, most of the literature 
dealing with the cost of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
32 include the costs of 
failed projects with those of successful projects.  In addition, the investments costs are 
usually capitalized (at the cost of capital of the pharmaceutical firm) to the point of 
marketing approval.  This is an ex-post assessment of the costs (and returns) of successful 
pharmaceutical products.  
The purpose of my analysis is to determine the value of the R&D project (or the 
patent) before investment starts.  In this context the expected cost to completion represent 
an ex-ante assessment of the costs of the project.  Some projects are successful, some fail 
(probability of failure), and some are abandoned (optimal exercise of the abandonment 
option).  The value of the project today takes into account that there is some probability 
                                                           
31 This framework would even allow for phase j+1 to start before the completion of phase j, which is 
sometimes the case in the drug development process. 
  27of failure and abandonment, but the expected costs are not increased to take into account 
this possibility.  The expected costs to completion in my analysis are related to what the 
literature calls “out-of -pocket cost per approved new chemical entity”.  
4.2 Patent Term Restoration 
  As mentioned earlier: “The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act changed the 
way in which the term of a U.S. patent has been calculated since 1861.  Unlike the former 
seventeen-year term, which was measured from the date that the patent issued, a patent 
that issues from an application filed on June 8, 1995, and thereafter has a term of twenty 
years measured from the date that the earliest U.S. patent application was filed.”
33  The 
new twenty-year term is subject to patent term extension for a period of time related to 
the regulatory period review.  To compensate for the regulatory review period by the 
FDA, an extension for up to five years can be obtained.  Extensions can be granted only 
if the remaining term of the patent is less than fourteen years after regulatory approval for 
market, and the remaining patent term and the extension combined cannot exceed 
fourteen years beyond the date of market approval. 
  This patent extension feature can also be incorporated in the simulation approach 
developed in this article.  For every path in the simulation, once the investment is 
completed and the drug approved, the regulatory review period is known.  Then, if the 
remaining time to the expiration of the patent is less that fourteen years, the period where 
cash flows are generated can be extended to fourteen years.  This modification would 
certainly increase somewhat the project values reported in Section 4. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32 See for example Di Masi et al (1991, 1995), DiMasi, Grabowski and Vernon (1995), and Grabowski and 
Vernon (1990, 1994). 
33 Marks (1996), page 445. 
  28  The discussion above is a somewhat simplistic description of how patents actually 
operate in practice.  The reality is that there is much more fuzziness around these patent 
issues.  For example, litigation over intellectual property is frequent when competitors 
have developed similar new drugs, and even if a firm may think it has patent protection 
for a particular drug, it is always possible that it may end up having a key patent declared 
invalid.
34  This type of issue is difficult to incorporate explicitly in the model developed.  
The probability of failure during the investment period, however, can implicitly take into 
account all those events that could put an end to the project. 
4.3  Cash Flows and Product Life Cycle 
In the development of the model, I have assumed that the cash flows process follows a 
Geometric random walk.  In reality pharmaceutical sales and cash flows start very low at 
the introduction of a new drug, then grow to a maximum close to the expiration of the 
patent, and decrease dramatically once the patent has expired
35.  One possible way to add 
this product life cycle to the analysis would be to superimpose a deterministic life cycle 
variable to the stochastic cash flows to be able to more closely mimic actual sales and 
cash flows.  This modification would somewhat change the timing of the cash flows, but 
would not change significantly the nature of the analysis. 
4.4 Patent Expiration and Entry 
The “1984 law Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act facilitated the 
entry of generic drug products after patent expiration while it also restored part of the 
patent life lost during the pre-market regulatory process for new introductions.”
36  Before 
                                                           
34 For a discussion of these issues see Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) and Schankerman and Scotchmer 
(2001).  For some Japanese evidence see Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001). 
35 See Grabowski and Vernon (1990, 1994). 
36 Grabowski and Vernon (1992), page 331. 
  291984 market entry by generics was limited due to the costly requirements imposed by the 
FDA for imitative products (i.e. duplicate many of the pioneer’s tests).  The 1984 law 
required generic products to demonstrate only bio-equivalence to the pioneer’s brand.  As 
a consequence, generic entry has increased significantly.  
The post-patent competitive process in which entry erodes patent-protected 
monopoly rents and eliminates the associated deadweight losses to society, has received 
relatively little attention in the literature
37.  To simplify the analysis of post-patent cash 
flows, the model developed in the previous sections assumed that the present value of 
these cash flows at the expiration of the patent is equal to a multiple of cash flows at that 
point in time.  This is similar to assuming that the terminal value of a firm is a multiple of 
earnings at a given horizon.  Alternative assumptions are possible.  For example, the life 
of the project could be extended into the post-patent period (i.e. five or ten years longer) 
and declining cash flows consistent with recent experience could be modeled. 
4.5 Tax Considerations 
Clearly, for valuing any project the relevant cash flows are the ones after taxes.  For 
simplicity, the model developed has completely abstracted form tax considerations and 
has implicitly assumed that all relevant cash flows are on an after tax basis.  For any 
particular project, however, tax distortions can be significant.   
  The tax situation of a particular project would depend on the fraction of the 
investment costs that can be expensed immediately, and the fraction that has to be 
capitalized for future depreciation, on whether the firm has other profitable projects for 
offsetting losses, etc.  However, for a given known situation, the simulation approach is 
                                                           
37 Notable exceptions are Caves et al. (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992). 
  30especially suited to deal with the path dependencies of capital expenditures and capital 
cost allowances.
38
4.6 Input Cost Uncertainty 
The dynamics of the expected cost to completion of the R&D project specified in 
Equation (1) assumes that all the uncertainty in the costs are of a technical nature, that is, 
it can only be resolved by investing.  Pindyck (1993) suggests the possibility of including 
in the stochastic process for the cost to completion also input cost uncertainty (e.g., prices 
of labor and materials) that are external to what the firm does and might be partially 
correlated with the overall economic activity. 
  Adding input cost uncertainty to the cost process, Equation (1) would be written 
as: 
(17)  Kdy dz IK Idt dK γ σ + + − = 2
1
) (  
where γ  is the input cost uncertainty and dy is an increment to a Gauss Wiener process 
that may be correlated with the return on the market portfolio and with the cash flow 
process.   
  A cost specification as in (17) could be easily incorporated in the simulation 
procedure described in Appendix.
39  The difficulty in adding input cost uncertainty would 
be that, if it is correlated with the return on the market, it would have a risk premium 
associated with it which might be difficult to estimate in practice. 
4.7 Options to Delay Investment, Stop Investment, and Restart the Project 
                                                           
38 See Schwartz and Moon (2001) for a discussion of these issues. 
39 A third standard normal variate, correlated with the other two, would have to be generated and Equation 
(A1) would have another term in the right hand side to deal with input cost uncertainty.  The rest of the 
procedure would be the same. 
  31The model discussed in the previous sections takes into account the option to abandon the 
project, but not the option to delay investment or the option to restart a project that has 
been previously stopped.  This is a reasonable framework for situations in which the 
product to be produced in the future is protected by a patent, since delaying investment 
shortens the duration of the future cash flows making it very unlikely that a stopped 
project would be restarted later on. 
  For situations in which the duration of the cash flows is independent of the 
duration of the investment, these options can become more important. Delaying 
investment does not shorten the duration of cash flows, though it still has the effect of 
generating cash flows more distant in the future.  In this case the value of the investment 
opportunity depends on the cost to completion, K, and the value of the asset obtained at 
the completion of the project, V(C,t) given by Equation (7), but not on calendar time 
since now T-t has a fixed duration independent on when the investment is completed.  
This problem generates an elliptical partial differential equation which can be solved by 
numerical methods to give the value of the project and the optimal investment strategy.
40  
This case is simpler since the duration of the cash flows is deterministic. 
5  Conclusions 
In this article I have developed and implemented a simulation approach to value R&D 
projects and patents that is based on the Real Options approach.  It takes into account 
uncertainty in the cost to completion of the project, uncertainty in the cash flows to be 
generated from the project, and the possibility of catastrophic events that could put an 
end to the effort before it is completed.  It also allows for the possibility of abandoning 
the project when costs turn out to be larger than expected or when estimated cash flows 
  32turn out to be smaller than anticipated.  This abandonment option represents a very 
substantial part of the project’s value when the project is marginal or/and when 
uncertainty is large. 
  Even though this article looks at R&D projects from the private point of view, the 
analysis has important public policy implications.  Regulation can affect not only the life 
of the patent, but also the cost of development and/or the prices charged for the product 
produced.  All of these will affect the profitability of R&D projects and, therefore, the 
amount of innovative output.  The model developed in this article should be of help to 
policy makers for analyzing the trade-off between promoting innovative efforts and 
securing competitive market outcomes.
41
In the development and analysis of this article, it has been taken for granted that 
development costs and the cash flows generated by the project are independent of the 
owner of the project.  As in many other types of projects this is not necessarily the case.  
There is some recent evidence that the R&D cost per new drug approved in the US 
decrease with firm size, while the sales per new drug approved increase with firm size.
42
  New regulatory initiatives in the United States have provided valuable 
opportunities for pharmaceutical developers to improve efficiency.
43  For example, the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, which authorized the collection of user fees by 
the FDA, resulted in a sharp decline in new drug approval times, and the FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997 established the “Fast Track Process” for speeding the 
development and approval of drugs that address unmet medical needs.  The model 
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 See Schwartz and Moon (2000). 
41 It should be pointed out that intellectual property is not the only mechanism for rewarding R&D.  Prizes 
and contract research of various types are also common.  For a discussion of these issues see Gallini and 
Schotchmer (2002). 
  33developed in this article is well suited to deal with economic effects of these types of 
issues. 
  There are important factors about the decision to invest in R&D that are not 
incorporated in the analysis of this article.  For example, recent theoretical work has 
stressed strategic interaction among rivals as a primary determinant of investment 
decisions. This approach has suggested some powerful insights into the dynamics of 
competition in R&D.
44
  The pharmaceutical industry appears to have suffered a decline in productivity 
over the last twenty years.  Henderson and Cockburn (1996b) use disaggregated data at 
the research program level to explore that decline.  They conclude that “the decline is 
probably not a function either of a shift to research in more difficult areas or of an 
increase in racing behavior in the industry.  Rather, our results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that rising real costs of research in the industry reflect decreasing returns.  The 
switch to more science-intensive methods of drug research appears to be a major 
contributor to increasing costs, but the most important driver of cost escalation appears to 
be the rocketing costs of developing clinical drugs.  We speculate that this probably 
reflects both a shift to the treatment of conditions that require more complex clinical trials 
and increasing regulatory stringency, but we have no data about those issues.”
45  As the 
investment process in R&D becomes more complex, tools as those suggested in this 
article will become more important in the evaluation and decision making processes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42 See DiMasi, Grabowski and Vernon (1995). 
43 See Kaitin and DiMassi (2000). 
44 See Cockburn and Henderson (1994), Reinganum (1989)  and Miltersen and Schwartz (2002). 
45 See Henderson and Cockburn (1996b), page 184. 
  34Summary 
This article develops and implements a simulation approach to value R&D projects and 
patents that is based on the Real Options approach.  It takes into account uncertainty in 
the cost to completion of the project, uncertainty in the cash flows to be generated from 
the project, and the possibility of catastrophic events that could put an end to the effort 
before it is completed.  It also allows for the possibility of abandoning the project when 
costs turn out to be larger than expected or when estimated cash flows turn out to be 
smaller than anticipated.  This abandonment option represents a very substantial part of 
the project’s value when the project is marginal or/and when uncertainty is large. 
  Even though this article looks at R&D projects from the private point of view, the 
analysis has important public policy implications.  Regulation can affect not only the life 
of the patent, but also the cost of development and/or the prices charged for the product 
produced.  All of these will affect the profitability of R&D projects and, therefore, the 
amount of innovative output.  The model developed in this article should be of help to 
policy makers for analyzing the trade-off between promoting innovative efforts and 
securing competitive market outcomes. 
  35Appendix: Solution Procedure 
The appendix describes the Monte Carlo simulation procedure used to solve the problem. 
The option to abandon the R&D project is computed using a variation of the least-squares 
method proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) for valuing American options.  The 
decision to abandon the project is evaluated at discrete points in time, instead of 
continuously.  This would seem to be a more reasonable assumption when analyzing 
R&D projects.  In the simulations, the following discrete approximations to Equations (1) 
and (4) are used: 
(A1)    1
2 / 1 2 / 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ε σ t IK t I t K t t K ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ +
(A2)    ) ) ( ) 5 . 0 * exp(( ) ( ) ( 2
2 / 1 2 ε φ φ α t t t C t t C ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ +
where  1 ε  and  2 ε   are standard normal variates with correlation ρ . 





=  is 
the number of periods per path in the simulation.  Equations (A1) and (A2) are used to 
generate N paths of NT periods each of costs to completion and cash flow rate.  Each 
path i is then described by two NT vectors K(i) and C(i).  After the cost to completion 
reaches zero, the K(i) vector is filled in with zeros. 
  The Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm (LSM) 
is used to provide a path-wise approximation to the optimal stopping rule that maximizes 
the value of the project. I assume that the option to abandon the project can only be 
exercised at the NT discrete times in the simulation and consider the optimal stopping 
policy at each exercise date.  The option to abandon the project has value only during the 
period of investment in R&D, since once the investment is completed the net cash flows 
  36are assumed to be positive and abandonment is never optimal.  At each possible exercise 
date, the value of the project is zero if abandoned.  The value of continuation can be 
obtained by taking the conditional expectation of the remaining discounted cash flows 
with respect to the risk-neutral measure.  The LSM approach uses least squares to 
approximate the conditional expectation function at each exercise date.  The project is 
abandoned if the expected value of the project next period is smaller than the marginal 
investment required this period. 
  Conditional on not having abandoned the project before, at the final expiration 
date of the patent (time NT), the value of the project for any path i is given by the 
boundary condition: 
(A3) ) , ( ) , ( NT i C M NT i W • =  
At any date j the value of the project, conditional on not having been abandoned before, 
for those paths for which the investment has been completed is computed recursively by: 
(A4) t j i C j i W t r j i W ∆ + + ∆ − = ) , ( ) 1 , ( ) exp( ) , (  
For all those paths for which investment is not completed and optimal abandonment is 
possible, the conditional expected value of continuation is estimated by regressing the 
discounted value of the project,  ) 1 , ( ) ) ( exp( + ∆ + − j i W t r λ
46, onto a set of basis functions 
of the state variables at time j
47.  The fitted value of this regression,  , is the best 
linear unbiased estimator of the conditional expectation.  For those paths for which this 
fitted value is smaller than the additional investment required in period j, abandonment is 
optimal and I set: 
) , ( ˆ j i W
                                                           
46 Note that during the period of investment the discount rate is equal to the risk free rate plus the Poisson 
probability of failure. 
47 In the implementation of the algorithm I use polynomials with nine terms. 
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For those paths for which the fitted value is larger than the additional investment 
required, abandonment is not optimal and the expected value of the project at time j is: 
(A6)   t I j i W j i W ∆ − = ) , ( ˆ ) , (
  The recursion proceeds by rolling back in time and repeating the procedure until 
the exercise decisions at each possible exercise time along each path have been 
determined.  The value of the R&D project is then computed by starting at time zero, 
moving forward along each path until the expiration of the patent or until the first 
stopping time occurs, discounting the resulting cash flows to time zero, and taking the 
average over all the paths.  When the optimal stopping time is time zero, the value of the 
project is zero.  Note that the value of the project obtained by this procedure is generally 
not equal to the average of the W(i,0)’s, since only the optimal stopping times generated 
by the algorithm are used, and not the expected values. 
  The value of the R&D project without the abandonment option can be easily 
computed as a byproduct of the procedure described above.  Note that this value will be 
in general different from the net present value (Equation (13)) since, even though it does 
not take into account the option to abandon, it does take into account the volatilities and 
the correlation of costs and cash flows. 
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Parameter Value 
Total Cost to Completion  $100 million 
Maximum Investment Rate  $10 million per year 
Cost Uncertainty   0.5 
Cash Flow Rate  $20 million per year 
Cash Flow Uncertainty  0.35 
Cash Flow Drift  0.02 
Terminal Cash Flow Multiple  5  
Annual Probability of Failure  0.07 
Time to Expiration of the Patent  20 years 
Correlation between Costs and Cash Flows  -0.1 
Risk Premium Associated with Cash Flows  0.036 
Risk-free Rate of Interest  0.05 
Time Step Size in Simulations  0.25 year 
Number of Simulations  100,000 
 




Value with abandonment option ($ million)  13.9  12.9  13.1  14.0  13.3 
Proportion of paths optimally abandoned (%)  40.8  39.9  42.5  40.4  41.3 
Value without abandonment option ($ million)  5.7  4.8  4.8  5.7  5.0 
 
Table 2: Values and Proportion Abandoned for Different Seeds 
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Quarter % Abandoned
12 . 5 8
25 . 8 5
35 . 1 8
44 . 0 7
53 . 4 0
62 . 5 6
72 . 2 2
81 . 6 6









Table 3: Percentage of Paths Abandoned in First Four Years 
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Cost Uncertainty Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
0.40 9.658 43.9 1.263 8.395
0.45 11.370 42.4 3.055 8.315
0.50 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
0.55 15.241 40.0 7.035 8.206
0.60 17.186 38.5 9.198 7.988
Cash Flow Uncertainty Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
0.25 10.926 40.2 4.221 6.705
0.30 12.128 40.8 4.607 7.521
0.35 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
0.40 14.433 42.1 5.392 9.041
0.45 15.401 43.6 5.830 9.571
Correlation Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
-0.10 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
-0.05 12.040 42.5 3.611 8.429
0.00 10.737 43.9 2.221 8.516
0.05 9.515 45.5 0.823 8.692
0.10 8.265 47.4 -0.581 8.846
Table 4: Comparative Statics with respect to Volatilities and Correlation 
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Expected Cost Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
80.00 32.812 18.6 30.060 2.752
90.00 21.818 28.1 16.691 5.127
100.00 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
110.00 7.047 56.0 -5.252 12.299
120.00 3.273 71.4 -14.116 17.389
Investment Rate Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
8.00 5.315 59.3 -5.935 11.250
9.00 9.160 49.1 -0.483 9.643
10.00 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
11.00 17.415 34.5 10.298 7.117
12.00 21.430 29.1 15.354 6.076
Cash Flow Rate Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
16.00 5.488 60.2 -7.072 12.560
18.00 9.036 49.3 -1.040 10.076
20.00 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
22.00 17.955 35.2 11.024 6.931
24.00 22.878 30.7 17.057 5.821
Cash Flow Multiple Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
3.00 9.633 49.1 -0.555 10.188
4.00 11.396 45.1 2.218 9.178
5.00 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
6.00 15.271 37.9 7.767 7.504
7.00 17.307 34.8 10.540 6.767
Table 5: Comparative Statics with respect to Cost and Cash Flow Parameters 
  45Cash Flow Drift Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
0.00 4.166 66.8 -10.320 14.486
0.01 7.734 52.3 -3.273 11.007
0.02 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
0.03 20.699 31.7 14.700 5.999
0.04 30.487 24.7 26.121 4.366
Probability of Failure Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
0.05 18.757 34.8 10.920 7.837
0.06 15.888 37.9 7.793 8.095
0.07 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
0.08 11.041 45.0 2.485 8.556
0.09 9.057 48.9 0.243 8.814
Risk Free Rate Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
0.03 27.415 28.9 21.133 6.282
0.04 19.489 34.3 12.290 7.199
0.05 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
0.06 8.522 50.0 -1.017 9.539
0.07 5.152 60.3 -5.951 11.103
 






Expiration of Patent Value with Option % Abandoned Value Without Option Option Value
18.00 9.037 49.3 -1.040 10.077
19.00 11.077 45.0 1.976 9.101
20.00 13.291 41.3 4.992 8.299
21.00 15.611 38.1 8.008 7.603
22.00 17.955 35.2 11.024 6.931
Table 7: Comparative Statics with respect to Time to Expiration of the Patent
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